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Abstract
Carsharing operators, which rent out electric
vehicles for minutes or hours, lose money on idle
vehicles. We develop a model that allows carsharing
operators to offer the storage of these vehicles on
operating reserve markets (market for quickly
rampable back-up power sources that replace for
instance failing power plants). We consider it a
dispatch and pricing problem with the tradeoff between
the payoffs of offering vehicles for rental and selling
their storage. This is a problem of stochastic nature
taking into account that people can rent electric
vehicles at any time. To evaluate our model we tracked
the location and status of 350 electric vehicles from the
carsharing company Car2Go and simulated the
dispatch in the Dutch market. This market needs to be
redesigned for optimal use of storage. We make
recommendations for the market redesign and show
that carsharing operators can make substantial
additional profits in operating reserve markets.

1. Introduction
Carsharing operators, which rent electric vehicles
for minutes or hours, lose money on idle vehicles. We
propose a new business model with which they can use
the storage of these idle electric vehicles (EVs) on
operating reserve markets to create higher profits. This
market is a smart market [11, 6, 3], which alleviates
power imbalances with a dynamic auction based
mechanism. In this market power sources are traded
that can serve as an instant back-up when another
power-source fails (for example when a power plant
has a defect), or to dump excess electricity (from for
example too much wind). Carsharing operators can
participate in this market as a Virtual Power Plant
(VPP). They pool together several electric vehicles
from different locations to act as if they were one
power source that can provide and take back electricity
according to the market’s need (13, 2).
We design offers (bids/asks) with respect to price
and quantity to participate in the tender for operating
reserves. These offers, which relate to both charging
and discharging, are determined by taking into account
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the expected revenues that could be earned by making
an electric vehicle available for rent at specific points
in time. That has the effect that whenever the market
accepts (settles) these offers, the carsharing company
always earns more with them than what they would
have earned by renting alone.
To test the effectiveness of our strategy we test it in
a simulation, which we calibrate with real data as
suggested by [9, 10]. To validate our finding we need
data on carsharing electric vehicle transactions and
their battery status over time and data on the operating
reserve market tender. We track the location and
battery status of 350 electric vehicles of their Car2Go
fleet (www.car2go.com) in real-time over a 14 month
period. The tender data on the operating reserve
auction is accessible through the Dutch transmission
system operator Tennet.
In our analysis we show that carsharing companies
can increase their profits by participating in operating
reserve markets with their electric vehicles as virtual
power plants. However, we find that under current
prices in the Netherlands it is not profitable to use
vehicle-2-grid (discharging the electric vehicles to
provide electricity to the grid). The increased revenues
come from charging the electric vehicles with excess
electricity from the grid. For example when wind parks
produce too much electricity for the grid to handle,
they pay the electric vehicles to absorb the excess
electricity. Therefore the carsharing operator saves
money on charging the electric vehicles in the first
place, plus the payment to take on excess electricity.
This means that the carsharing operator needs to be
more flexible over time on when to charge the electric
vehicles but we show that this does not significantly
affect rental operations.
The strategy that our model prescribes is
sustainable as it helps to balance volatile renewable
energy sources. As the demand for renewable energy is
increasing in many parts of the world there will also be
a higher need for operating reserve power, which we
can partially deliver with electric vehicles. With an
increased demand also vehicle-2-grid may be
economically worthwhile. With the strategy that our
model prescribes, we create an incentive for people and
business to behave sustainably, which is "an
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opportunity to create shared value -- that is, a
meaningful benefit for society that is also valuable to
the business" [13].
The paper is structured as follows. First, we will
describe the background of our work on how the
operating reserve market works and present the
literature that our model builds on. Second, we explain
the details of our model. After we have outlined the
model we go in on the data and will illustrate how we
use the data to evaluate the model. Next, we will
analyze our findings. Finally we will conclude our
work including an outlook on future research.

2. Background and related work
In this section we will first provide a background of
the market functioning of operating reserves. We will
also make recommendations on how this market should
be adapted in the future to be suitable for storage.
Afterwards, we will describe the literature on the field
of smart charging and vehicle-2-grid with electric
vehicles, what has been done already, and how our
research extends what has been done so far.

2.1. Operating reserve market design
The operating reserve market is an auction which is
usually administered by the transmission system
operator. This market guarantees to keep the grid in
balance at all times by avoiding over or
underproduction of electricity which would result in
blackouts. To participate in this market participating
parties have to show that their resources can ramp up
to full production capacity within 30 seconds so that it
can react quickly when there is over or under
production. The tender for this auction is done on a
weekly basis where parties can submit their offers for
the upcoming week. They can submit asks if they want
to sell electricity and they can submit bids if they want
to buy electricity. Once their bids and asks are
submitted the units need to be available (reserved) at
all times for which they are compensated with a
capacity fee. The market operator decides based on
demand and supply whether to the offered asks or bids
are executed. The executed bids and asks are paid the
respective price that they submitted with their offers
and are settled in merit order (cheapest resources are
used first). The clearing mechanism functions as a
“pay-as-bid” auction. Figure 1 illustrates the market
clearing mechanism. In this example the market needs
to get rid of clearing quantity Q*=1,100 MWh. All
participating bids are sorted in merit order so that bids
1, 5, 16, and 3 (partially) are settled. This means that
they have to use the quantity specified in their bids and

Figure 1. Multi-unit pay-as-bid auction. All bids to
the left of Q* (bid 1, 5, 16, and partially 3) are
cleared at their respective prices (50, 100, 120,
and 175 $/MWh).
are paid their submitted price. Note that there is a 1
MWh minimum lot size on this market, which we will
disregard as in reality one would just need larger fleets.

8.1.1. Recommended changes to market design.
Current regulations reflect a market that is
characterized by fossil fuel based resources. In
theoretically extreme cases it could ask participating
parties to deliver electricity for the whole week. This
would require very large batteries that would never be
used to their full capacity. We therefore recommend
and will proceed as if the market would allow bids for
time intervals with 15 minute increments. This allows
also storage to participate in this market and is in line
with recommendations by a study commissioned by a
consortium of Dutch and German transmission system
operators [1].

2.2. Operating reserves from electric vehicles
Previous research has already studied smart
charging. In smart charging electric vehicle owners get
financial incentives to shift charging times to less
congested hours. Fridgen et al. [5] and Valogianni et
al. [19] have shown that this reduces peaks in the grid.
Other studies have also studied the vehicle-2-grid
concept. Its efficiency has been validated by an
information system in a micro grid context [4]. Given
the departure times of EVs parked at public charging
stations other authors [8] show a reduction in the
monthly energy bill of 24.8%. A similar setting was
also researched by Vytelingum et al. [20] who find a
utility bill reduction of 14% for households that use a
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battery exposed to dynamic pricing at the energy
wholesale market. Other studies that consider electric
vehicles estimate the annual profits per vehicle to be
$10-120 [12], $176-203 [17], and $415-826 [15].
However, none of these studies use data from electric
vehicles or take uncertainty about driving behavior into
account. Tomic and Kempton [18] show that vehicle-2grid can be profitable with a real fleet of hybrid electric
vehicles. However, this study assumes that the time
and distance of the trips made with these electric
vehicles are known perfectly in advance. A
shortcoming of the existing studies is that they assume
trips are assumed to be known in advance. This does
not always hold in reality and is problematic when an
electric vehicle is committed to either charge or to do
vehicle-2-grid at the same time as someone needs to
drive it. We will describe our model, which builds on
[7] in the next section, does not make strong
assumptions on driving patterns and is therefore
applicable in practice in contrast to previous studies.

3. Model Description
We submit offers to the operating reserve auction
that reflect the underlying valuations of the carsharing
company. These offers include the (opportunity) cost
for the operator to commit electric vehicles to the
market. The model makes decisions about how much
storage should be offered (Q) and at what price (P).
The quantity and price can be different per 15 minute
time interval to reflect the different expected profits
from rental transactions which changes over the course
of a day/week. Our model determines quantities and
prices for both discharging and charging for each time
interval and submits them to the market. Based on the
merit order the market decides whether and to what
degree he wants to make use of these offers. If the
market decides it wants to use these offers for a certain
15 minute time interval we need to provide and absorb
the requested quantity up to the maximum of the full
offered quantity Q. For that purpose we have to
allocate specific electric vehicles. If these electric
vehicles are available everything is fine. However, if
we observe in the data that during this process a
customer rented one of those electric vehicles, we can
create a virtual power plant. A virtual power plant
means that it does not matter to the market which
electric vehicle to deploy as long as we deliver the
committed quantity. That is if another idle electric
vehicle is available and connected to the grid we can
replace the rented one with the other idle electric
vehicle and still live up to our commitment and rent
out an electric vehicle. We are dealing with
asymmetric payoffs in this case. While renting out an

electric vehicle earns around $15 of profits on average,
storage only earns $0.05 on average. But under no
circumstances can we go back on our commitment to
the operating reserve market because this would lead to
high penalties (ACM Framework Agreement Art. 7,
Par. 3). We therefore have to adapt our models to
reflect these asymmetric payoffs. Whenever we do
commit units to the operating reserve market we need
to be very certain that these electric vehicles will not
be rented out. Therefore we apply a sampling method
that is proportional to the payoffs more likely to select
training cases where electric vehicles are rented. In
other words the proportion of rental:NoRental cases in
the training data set is sampled 300:1 ($15/$0.05). In
general we apply a two month training data set to learn
about the availability of vehicles and the prices we
should charge and evaluate it over one test week (the
tender period). We chose two month because we had
14 month of data and could then test our strategy over
a whole year. In the following we will describe in more
detail how exactly we determine the offer quantities
(Q) and then we will describe how we will price (P)
these quantities.

3.1. Offer quantity composition
We need to know how much idle capacity for both
charging and discharging the entire fleet has at any
future time. We consider only electric vehicles parked
at charging stations for this. This is the quantity that we
want to submit to the operating reserve market. We use
the machine learning algorithms neural networks,
random forest, and support vector machines to predict
the storage available for charging (Qcharge) and the
storage available to discharge (Qdischarge). The quantity
needs to be known up to one week in advance already
because that is when the tender closes for the following
week. The quantities are discounted by a charging and
discharging efficiency of 96% and 97.4% respectively
[16]. The underlying logic and therefore model is the
same for charging and discharging, as it depends on the
day of the week, the hour of the day, and the lagged
dependent variable (based on the availability in the
weeks before at the same day and time):
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 (t)
+𝛽2 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑦 (t)
+𝛽3 ∗ 𝑦𝑡−1..9

(Equation 1)

where y can either be Qdischarge or Qcharge depending on
which variable one wants to forecast; the underlying
model is the same.
A random forest model with 2 randomly
preselected variables, 1000 randomized trees, and a
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minimum sum of weights for splitting of 5 was the
method with the highest accuracy for both Qcharge and
Qdischarge.

3.2. Offer price composition
Besides the offer quantities, we also have to
determine what price we would like to get for these
offers. We will consider ask prices (P discharge) and bid
prices (Pcharge) separately as they have different cost
structures.
3.2.1. Ask (discharging) price. We construct the ask
price by taking into account the cost that the carsharing
operator incurs from the electricity tariff (one has to
charge the battery before one can discharge it), the
battery depreciation cost, the expected rental profits,
plus a margin to make a profit in a “pay-as-bid”
market.
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒

𝑃𝑡

= 𝐸𝑇 + 𝐷 + 𝜋
̂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡

(Equation 2)

where ET is the industrial electricity tariff that the
$
carsharing company is eligible for (ET=0.1
in the
kWh

$

Netherlands), D is the depreciation cost (D=$0.13
),
kWh
π
̂ is the expected rental profits (also determined with a
random forest model from Equation 1 through the day
of the week, the hour of the day, and lagged dependent
variables), and μ is a profit margin which is determined
by optimizing it over the two month training period to
maximize gross profits.
3.2.2. Bid (charging) price. We construct the bid price
by taking into account the opportunity cost of not
having to charge the electric vehicles at the industrial
electricity tariff, the expected rental profits, plus a
margin to make a profit in a “pay-as-bid” market.
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒

𝑃𝑡

= −𝐸𝑇 + 𝜋
̂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡

(Equation 3)

where ET is the industrial electricity tariff of the
carsharing company, π
̂ is the expected rental profit
(also determined with a random forest model from
Equation 1 through the day of the week, the hour of the
day, and lagged dependent variables), and μ is a profit
margin which is optimized over the training period for
the highest payoff.

4. Data
We run a simulation which we calibrate with real
world data on operating reserve tenders and carsharing

electric vehicle usage. Our simulation comes very
close to an actual field study except for the one case
when the model decided to commit the storage of a car
to the market, while in reality someone has rented this
car which is mutually exclusive. We do account for the
reduced revenues but we cannot account for the minor
difference that after the rental the car in the dataset is
located where the customer dropped it off after rental,
while in the simulation we assume that the rental did
not happen. However, this does not have an impact on
the overall results because we will show that we rarely
have to forego rental customers and location does not
have a direct effect on the ability to offer reserve
capacity on average.

4.1. Operating reserve auction data
The tender data, including the individual bids and
market clearing quantities, for the Dutch operating
reserve market are published daily by the Transmission
System operator Tennet on its website. We use this
data to reconstruct the merit order curve and the market
clearing quantity Q* both to absorb excess electricity
and to provide additional electricity. In these merit
order curves we insert additional bids and asks from
the virtual power plant of electric vehicles of Car2Go.
Then we clear the market according to the market
clearing mechanism as described in Section 2.1. Figure
2 illustrates the average operating reserve balancing
prices over the course of a day in the period June 2014
– June 2015. The grey line shows the highest average
market price for charging in that period and how it
changes every 15 minute interval. The black line shows
the highest market clearing price that one would get for
discharging an electric vehicle for every 15 minute
interval. In general the market price for discharging is
much higher than the price for charging because it
needs to be generated. Note also the high standard
deviations as indicated by the bars, which show that at
times prices can be significantly higher than the
average price. For simplicity we did not account for
capacity prices making our results more conservative.

4.2. Electric vehicle usage data
Daimler provided us with data from their
carsharing subsidiary Car2Go on Electric Vehicles in
Amsterdam. Car2Go is a free floating carsharing
business that rents electric vehicles to customers for
very short amounts of time (minutes, hours).
Customers can pick up any of the cars and rent them.
After they have finished the rental they can to return it
to any public parking spot within the defined operating
area. Customers have to pay for the electric vehicles on
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Figure 2. Average operating reserve market prices in the Netherlands 2014-2015
a minute basis plus a distance surcharge when it
exceeds a 50 km threshold. The data that we get
includes information about an ID of the electric
vehicle, the state of charge in %, the latitude, the
longitude, the interior status (good/bad), the exterior
status (good/bad), the street, the zip code, the city, and
whether the car is currently charging or not. This
information is available to us in real time. We
download this data every 5 minutes and add a
timestamp (date and time) to the data for the 14 month
period March 1st 2014 – June 29th 2015. The data
contains entries for parked vehicles only. However,
based on the information of how long the electric
vehicle is missing and the change in battery status we
can infer the rental revenues based on an average fuel
usage quite accurately. We calculate the rental tariff
per minute times the duration plus the tariff per km
times the distance for the rental transaction revenues.

5. Evaluation
In this section we are mainly concerned with the
economic evaluation of using electric vehicles in
virtual power plants for carsharing operators. We will
illustrate how economical this is with the example of
Amsterdam. First, we will analyze the decision making
of our model and how this influences the profitability
of Car2Go. Then we will consider seasonal patterns in
carsharing and in the profitability of virtual power
plants. Finally, we will put the output of the virtual
power plant in perspective to the larger requirement for
balancing capacity.

5.1. Decision accuracy and profits
The elaborate decisions that our model does for
each individual 15 minute time slot over the period of a
year in terms of prices and quantities to sell and buy
electricity are settled in the market and executed
accordingly. We have analyzed these decisions in
terms of their costs and revenues for Car2Go in
Amsterdam. Overall we can represent this as a
classification problem. We have the choice to either
commit the storage on the operating reserve market or
not (equivalent to making it available for rental). Table
2 shows the confusion matrix with the aggregated
profits of the choices we faced during the whole year.
In the case that our model predicted that electric
vehicles should not be committed to the operating
reserve market it was right quite often and earned
$1178,000 gross profits from the rentals (true
negatives). In many cases this decision was also wrong
but this is not as problematic, because we did not do
anything with idle cars, which happens currently with
all idle electric vehicles (false negatives). In case that
the model predicted that it would be most profitable to
make a virtual power plant, while it would have been
even more profitable to rent that vehicle we lost $400
gross profits in opportunity cost compared to only the
rental business model (false positives). However, the
additional profits from the operating reserve market
when it was also most profitable to commit to the
operating reserve market make up for this by earning
an additional $17.000 gross profits annually (true
positives). Overall this means that by engaging in
virtual power plants on the operating reserve market,
electric vehicle carsharing owners can gain an
additional $16.600 gross profits, which is a 1.4%
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Table 2. The confusion matrix shows how
profitable the decisions of our model are. The
added value from virtual power plants (VPP)
exceeds the losses from foregone rentals by far.
Predicted
VPP
Actual

VPP
Rented

Rented

+$17,000

-

-$400

$1178,000

increase in gross profits. This number may appear low,
but we did not take into account fixed costs of vehicles.

5.2. Seasonal variation
The data indicates that there is a seasonal variation
in the rental data. Specifically, carsharing services are
used more frequently in winter months in Amsterdam
(in hotter regions it may be the summer months due to
air conditioning in cars). Figure 3 shows how the gross
profits develop over the year (black line). One can see
clear spikes from December – March, while it is at a
lower level between April – November. The erratic
behavior also within the seasons may be explainable by
weather differences within this period, which we leave
open for future research. The profits from the virtual
power plants (grey line) do not seem to follow a
seasonal pattern. However, the profits with virtual
power plants are consistently higher than the profits
from rental only. We conclude that our model performs
well and profits are evenly distributed over the seasons.

5.2. Contribution to operating reserve market
Our model is not only profitable for carsharing
operators, but it also increases the competition on

Figure 3. Shows the profit over the year. The Winter
period is a driving factor for rentals in Amsterdam.
The profits from offering virtual power plant power
on the real-time market increases the gross profits
of Car2Go consistently.

operating reserve markets. Specifically, the electric
vehicles offer a lucrative way for market operators to
dump their excess electricity. This is especially
relevant for increasing shares of renewable energy
sources in the future. Figure 4 shows that the market
never settled asks to discharge electricity and during
the whole year not a single MWh was discharged,
which is evident from the flat grey line. However, the
electric vehicles contributed significantly to the market
for excess electricity, which is consistent across the
year. We see that mid 2014 there was a much higher
need for storage from electric vehicles than in the
beginning of 2015. This is due to a general decrease in
the market price in this period (from 11 $/MWh to
6$/MWh), which makes it less likely that our bids fall
within the equilibrium quantities (Q*).

6. Conclusion
We have shown that electric vehicle carsharing
companies can enhance their profits by selling the
storage of their idle electric vehicles on markets for
back-up power (operating reserve markets). Compared
to previous research we did not make strong
assumptions on driving patterns that are known in
advance and show that even with stochastic driving
patterns it increases profits. With current back-up
power market prices, battery depreciation cost, and
charging infrastructure carsharing companies can earn
most additional profits by charging their electric
vehicles at times when the grid needs to get rid of
excess electricity. Even though some rental profits are
forgone in this way this is compensated by far from
savings on cost for charging and they get an additional
payment for this grid service. Our model can already
be implemented with the currently available
technology in Amsterdam and is ready for a practice

Figure 4. Shows the virtual power plant output over
the year. It is striking that throughout the year
much energy from the real-time market is used to
charge the vehicles, while discharging vehicle-2o
grid (V2G) does not occur only sporadically.3090

trial. We find that vehicle-2-grid is less economically
sound under current circumstances, which may,
however, change with increasing shares of renewable
energy sources and decreasing battery cost. It would
also require bidirectional charging poles which are not
yet widely available.
For future research we are interested in an
international comparison. The Netherlands have
relatively low operating reserve market prices due to a
minor share of renewable energy sources of the total
electricity mix. It would be interesting to compare the
Dutch case to Germany or California, which have a
higher share of renewable energy sources. Another
way to increase the accuracy of our model is to take the
limits of distribution systems into account. In contrast
to conventional power plants electric vehicles are much
better distributed over the city and can alleviate the
burden on distribution systems and substations.
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